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The Deregulatory State
by Lawrence O. Gostin

P

ublic health can be achieved only
through collective action. Individuals acting alone cannot protect
themselves from work hazards, unsafe or
ineffective vaccines and pharmaceuticals, impure food and water, a polluted
environment, or epidemics. Only a wellregulated society can secure the essential
conditions for health. Yet in this country, successive administrations have
eroded health and safety protections.
The consequences include deaths in the
mining industry, lead in toys, industrial
solvents in toothpaste, harmful bacteria
in peanut butter and spinach, and unsafe and ineffective pharmaceuticals
(such as COX-2 inhibitors and nonstatin cholesterol medications).
The “Deregulatory State” is a result
of a conservative campaign that has created and reinforced deep-seated concerns about overbearing government.
The political dialogue used to describe
agency action is pejorative and effective:
“big government,” “centralized,” “topdown,” and “bureaucratic.” This antigovernment narrative has set the terms
of the debate about the role of government in protecting the public from market excesses and failures.
The Deregulatory State takes many
subtle forms, including self-policing, so
that industry discloses and corrects its
own safety violations; incapacitating, so
that agencies are starved of expertise and
resources; devolving, so that residual regulation is focused at the local level; preempting, so that the federal government
denies states the authority to protect
their citizens; and privatizing, so that
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government functions are conducted by
“for-profit” or voluntary entities. In this
column, I will focus on two broad categories of deregulation: federal preemption and privatization.
Regulatory Vacuums through
Preemption

C

ongress has the power to preempt,
or supersede, public health regulation at the state level, even if the state is
acting squarely within its police powers.
Federal preemption may seem like an arcane doctrine, but it has powerful consequences for the public’s health and safety. The Supreme Court’s preemption decisions can effectively foreclose meaningful state regulation and prevent people from turning to the courts for legal
redress.1 Preemption has had antiregulatory effects on issues ranging from tobacco control to occupational health
and safety, motor vehicle safety, and employer health care plans. From 2001 to
2006, Congress enacted twenty-seven
statutes that preempt state health, safety,
and environmental policies, demonstrating the potential breadth of federal
power to override state public health
safeguards.2
The Bush administration has vigorously advocated preemption to invalidate state public health efforts in both
amicus curiae briefs and preambles to
agency rules. On February 20, 2008, the
Roberts Court handed the administration a victory in two major preemption
cases. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transport Association, the Court held
that a federal transportation statute pre-

empted Maine’s laws designed to prevent minors from buying cigarettes on
the Internet.3 In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
the Court ruled that manufacturers are
immune from tort liability for medical
devices, such as implantable defibrillators or heart pumps, that received premarket approval and meet Food and
Drug Administration specifications.4
The Court just heard another FDA preemption case on whether tort liability
can be based on fraud for misrepresenting or withholding information from
the agency during the approval process.
And next term, the Court will decide
whether FDA drug approval preempts
personal injury suits. In effect, the executive and judicial branches are dismantling a long-standing civil justice safety
net for consumers and patients who suffer from industry misconduct left
unchecked by federal and state regulations.
Outside the courtroom, multiple
agencies charged with protecting public
health, safety, and the environment have
systematically pushed for preemption
through administrative rulemaking.
Federal agencies have inserted preemptory language in preambles to rules governing everything from seatbelt placement (this from the National Highway
Traffic and Safety Administration) and
mattress flammability (the Consumer
Product Safety Commission) to drug labeling (the FDA) and railroad safety
(the Railroad Administration). This
troubling trend is made all the more
worrisome by the administration’s failure to provide an opportunity for public
comment on the preemption language
in rule preambles.
This sweeping preemption of state
regulation and tort actions has created
regulatory vacuums. Instead of advocating devolution or otherwise supporting
state authority to protect the public’s
health, the federal government has consistently derailed state regulation. At the
same time, it has dismantled federal
safety standards, leaving a large regulatory abyss. For example, even after the
Supreme Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency had the
power to regulate heat-trapping gases
emitted by automobiles, the agency not
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only refused to regulate but also prevented California from filling the regulatory gap.5
Thus, the public remains unprotected prospectively because the federal government both declines to regulate and
suppresses state efforts to do so. And the
public is unprotected retrospectively because of the Court’s invalidation of state
tort law. In short, the public is left to
fend for itself.
Trusting the Private Sector

P

rivatization, understood broadly, is
the government’s abdication of responsibility for health governance by assigning public functions to the private
sector. It can happen directly, when the
state contracts out governmental functions to industry (such as in mental
health care, prisons, or child welfare services). Or it can happen indirectly, when
the state withdraws financial and political support for critical agency functions,
cooperates with industry in setting and
enforcing standards, or simply allows
companies to self-regulate.
Agency incapacity. Government can
avoid stringent regulation simply by
starving agencies of funds or making
them rely on industry largess for resources. The FDA offers a classic case
study of how the White House and
Congress can weaken a once powerful
agency. The FDA is responsible for the
safety of approximately 80 percent of
food sold and all human drugs, vaccines,
and medical devices. All told, it regulates
25 percent of all consumer spending—
about $1 trillion per year. Yet Congress
has steadily either reduced funding or
held it constant, even as the FDA’s functions have expanded vastly, and public
concern for food, drug, and medical devices has increased. The FDA’s resource
shortfalls have resulted in inadequate inspections, a dearth of scientists, inability
to speed the development of new therapies, and neglect of food and drug imports. For example, the FDA now carries out 78 percent fewer food inspections than thirty-five years ago and inspects food manufacturers on average
only once every ten years. The agency
needs twice its current level of funding
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to be properly equipped to fulfill its mission.6 The FDA is also hampered by the
lack of clear regulatory authority, organizational problems, and a scarcity of
postapproval data about drugs’ risks and
benefits.7 Just as troubling, the FDA’s
major source of funding for drug approvals is user fees from pharmaceutical
companies, which invites criticism
about the agency’s close relationship
with industry.
Self-policing. As part of the trend
against state regulation, agencies have
developed self-policing programs that
shift the burden of regulatory compliance from government to industry. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s “Voluntary Protection
Program” exempts participating firms
from routine inspection and eschews
formal adjudication. With the virtual
nonenforcement of violations under this
program, industry’s abysmal record of
safety compliance is not surprising.
OSHA has repeatedly failed to prosecute
firms with a long history of safety violations, even in the face of debilitating injuries and deaths caused by employer
negligence.8 Similarly, the Department
of Veterans Affairs’ “Medical Errors”
program asks hospitals to self-disclose
dangerous forms of malpractice, and the
EPA’s “Greenlights” recognizes and rewards firms for self-disclosing and correcting safety violations. But industry
has only mild incentives to self-police,
and researchers say they do so only if
agencies increase inspections and compliance.9
Self-regulation. In an increasingly
deregulated state, industry representatives, rather than government, have initiated much contemporary “regulatory”
activity. Forms of industry self-regulation include codes of conduct, collaborative agreements, accreditation, information disclosure, and ratings. These
programs govern a wide array of domains, including worker and product
safety, consumer protection, environmental management, fire prevention,
and advertising (such as for tobacco and
alcoholic beverages). Perhaps the most
prominent recent illustration of self-regulation is the decision by food and beverage manufacturers to limit sales in

schools and curb advertising to children.
But more often than not, self-regulation
occurs in response to pressure by government or advocacy groups. For example, the food and beverage industries announced their schools and advertising
policies shortly after the publication of
Federal Trade Commission reports highlighting their deceptive practices and the
risks of obesity.
Because they are not in a position to
defend themselves and their families,
members of society need the protection
of the state. If the government drastically reduces regulation and enforcement
and leaves core government duties to the
private sector, current and future generations will suffer. Indeed, it was in
recognition of the palpable harms of the
free market that health, safety, and environmental regimes and civil justice systems emerged. They have evolved over a
long period to work synergistically in
their protective effect; the whole system
is now under serious threat.
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